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WHEN THE PURSUIT OF LIBERTY COLLIDES WITH THE RULE OF LAW

ABSTRACT
In his 1979 article, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, Arthur Leff argued that in the absence of a god-grounded ethical and
legal system, “there cannot be any normative system ultimately based on anything except human will.” Stated differently,
any human determination of what is moral that is separated from the unchanging moral standard of God is arbitrary and,
likely, inconsistent. The difficulty with a human-will based system is that either each person is morally autonomous, in which
case no government rules contradicting the individual's moral determination could be justified, or the will of the majority
constitutes what is right, in which case there is no such thing as individual rights. The inherent inconsistency in the standards
for right and wrong stems from the fact that what is right potentially changes every time a new group of people is given
authority to declare right and wrong. In the end, Leff concluded that the only way to avoid the inevitable power struggle
that results from an arbitrary system of moral determinations is to treat the U.S. Constitution as functioning in the role
of a god. As Leff predicted, however, a crisis arises when the Constitution is perceived as having gaps in making the moral
determinations because someone (or some group of people) will fill the gaps with their moral compass. What Leff did not
understand when he wrote the article is that the United States had already reached that crisis.
The United States Supreme Court's 1973 pronouncement that our Constitution protected the right of abortion took us swiftly
down the path of establishing a system where each person is morally autonomous. That autonomy became the focus of the
Court's decisions in Casey, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell. Those decisions epitomize the constitutional crisis *668
about which Leff warned. In particular, a rule of law system ceases to provide consistency, stability, predictability, and equal
protection under the law when it defines individual liberties and equal protection based on the ever-changing standard of a
majority of Supreme Court Justices.
This Article will focus on the Supreme Court's reliance on “transcendent” principles in its quest to bring full meaning to
the constitutional guarantee of liberty. The goal of the Article is to demonstrate that “transcendent” principles must refer
to a higher source of law that provides objective standards of right and wrong, because a legal system based on man-made
determinations of right and wrong undermines the very nature of a rule of law based legal system. In America, with its
foundations rooted in Judeo-Christian principles, the only source for a higher law that is objective--not subjectively based
on the standards of those deciding the case--is the Bible. Any other standard for right and wrong that is based on the views
of individual people, a national consensus, or some common moral standards discerned by five Supreme Court Justices is
inherently subjective and leads to the constitutional crisis Leff warned of.
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Part I of this Article presents a summary of Casey, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, highlighting the Court's reliance
on “transcendent” principles to decide those cases. It explains that the Court's reliance on transcendent principles has led
to arbitrary, man-made law, because the higher law invoked by the Court is in reality the ever-changing moral code of the
majority of the Justices on the bench. Part II then discusses the proper foundation for interpreting the U.S. Constitution,
highlighting the biblical foundation for our laws and how separation of powers and principles of limited government best
protect our liberties. Part III re-analyzes Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell in light of the objective, transcendent principles
that a rule of law system requires.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his 1979 article, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, Arthur Leff argued that in the absence of a god-grounded ethical
and legal system, “there cannot be any normative system ultimately based on anything except human will.” 1 Stated
differently, any human determination of what is moral *669 that is separated from the unchanging moral standard
of God is arbitrary and, likely, inconsistent. The difficulty with a human-will based system is that either each person is
morally autonomous, in which case no government rules contradicting the individual's moral determination could be
justified, or the will of the majority constitutes what is right, in which case there is no such thing as individual rights. The
inherent inconsistency in the standards for right and wrong stems from the fact that what is right potentially changes
every time a new group of people is given authority to declare right and wrong. In the end, Leff concluded that the only
way to avoid the inevitable power struggle that results from an arbitrary system of moral determinations is to treat the
U.S. Constitution as functioning in the role of a god. 2 As Leff predicted, however, a crisis arises when the Constitution
is perceived as having gaps in making the moral determinations because someone (or some group of people) will fill the
gaps with their moral compasses. 3 What Leff did not understand when he wrote the article is that America had already
reached that crisis in America.
The United States Supreme Court's 1973 pronouncement that our Constitution protected the right of abortion 4 took
us swiftly down the path of establishing a system where each person is morally autonomous. That autonomy became
the focus of the Court's decisions in Casey, 5 Lawrence, 6 Windsor, 7 and Obergefell. 8 Those decisions epitomize the
constitutional crisis about which Leff warned. In particular, a rule of law system ceases to provide consistency, stability,
predictability, and equal protection under the law when it defines individual liberties and equal protection based on the
ever-changing standard of a majority of Supreme Court Justices.
This Article will focus on the Supreme Court's reliance on “transcendent” principles in its quest to bring full meaning to
the constitutional guarantee of liberty. The goal of the Article is to demonstrate that “transcendent” principles must refer
to a higher source of law that provides objective standards of right and wrong, because a legal system based on manmade determinations of right and wrong undermines the very nature of a rule of law based legal system. In America,
with its foundations rooted in Judeo-Christian principles, the only source for a *670 higher law that is objective--not
subjectively based on the standards of those deciding the case--is the Bible. Any other standard for right and wrong that
is based on the views of individual people, a national consensus, or some common moral standards discerned by five
Supreme Court Justices is inherently subjective and leads to the constitutional crisis Leff warned of.
Part I of this Article presents a summary of Casey, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, highlighting the Court's reliance
on “transcendent” principles to decide those cases. The Article explains that the Court's reliance on transcendent
principles has led to arbitrary, man-made law, because the higher law invoked by the Court is in reality the ever-changing
moral code of the majority of the Justices on the bench. Part II then discuss the proper foundation for interpreting the
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U.S. Constitution, highlighting the biblical foundation for our laws. Part III re-analyzes Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell
in light of the objective, transcendent principles that a rule of law system requires.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ASSERTED RELIANCE ON HIGHER LAW PRINCIPLES
A. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
Nineteen years after the Supreme Court declared in Roe v. Wade 9 that the United States Constitution embodies a
fundamental right of privacy that permits a woman to abort her child, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 10 affirmed its prior declaration of that right. In Roe, the Court admitted that the
Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to privacy, but found a privacy right arising out of the penumbras of
the Bill of Rights. 11 After identifying prior decisions where the Court had declared a right to marriage, procreation,
contraception, and child rearing, the Court concluded that the privacy right *671 “is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 12 While the Roe Court engaged in legal sophistry in
admitting, on the one hand, that a woman's asserted right to abortion would fail if the unborn fetus were established to
be a person, 13 and then, on the other hand, stating that it “need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins,” 14
the Casey decision is, in some respects, more legally indefensible.
In at least three respects, the Casey decision represents the arbitrary decisionmaking that Arthur Leff believed created
a constitutional crisis. First, the Casey Court refused to perform the one task the Supreme Court is to fulfill--that of
applying the Constitution to the case before it. In Casey, the Court was again presented with the question of whether a
woman had a right to abort her unborn child and, if so, whether certain state laws were constitutional in the face of the
woman's right. 15 The Court, however, refused to state whether Roe was properly decided. Instead, the Court stated,
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the valuation of the state
interest came before it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is
insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions. 16
In fact, the Court twice referred to the fact that the Court should affirm Roe even if “in error ....” 17 Thus, rather than
address whether Roe correctly weighed the state's interest in life as against the declared right to abortion, the Casey Court
assumed it was true and then built on Roe as if it were legitimate precedent.

Second, the Casey Court affirmed Roe's conclusion that there was a right to abortion because the Court was concerned
about its legitimacy. *672 Specifically, the Court stated that a decision overruling Roe “would seriously weaken the
Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a nation dedicated to the rule of
law.” 18 Thus, the Court elevated public perception of the judiciary over an attempt to reach the right result.
Third, and most relevant to the discussion in this Article, is the Court's decision to untether the definition of the liberty
guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment from any solid footing. The Casey Court announced, for the first time in
its precedents, that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.” 19 It further explained that whatever liberty means, it precludes the Court
(and ostensibly the Pennsylvania legislature that enacted the law struck down in Casey) from mandating its “own moral
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code.” 20 The Court did not provide much guidance on what the outer limits are of a person's right to define his own
concept of existence, of meaning, and of the universe, except to suggest in passing that eugenics would not be protected. 21
In addition to the highly individualistic perspective on the meaning of liberty--that each person defines for herself the
concept of existence, of meaning, and even of the universe--the Casey Court laid bare its position that the meaning of the
written words in the Constitution evolve over time: “Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's written
terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one.” 22 Admittedly, our Constitution embodies
principles that are to survive one generation to another, but to state that the terms must be understood anew with each
generation permits the Constitution to evolve (or devolve) to something very different than its original meaning. To
permit the Constitution's protections to change through judicial interpretations strips the Constitution's amendment
provision of any meaning and puts the Supreme Court, as Arthur Leff warned, in the role of a god. 23 The Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas highlights this point.
*673 B. Lawrence v. Texas
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas law that criminalized sodomy. 24 The
specific question presented in Lawrence was whether plaintiffs had a right in the exercise of their liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in sodomy. 25 Seventeen years earlier, the Court had examined
the same question and concluded that liberty did not include the right to engage in that conduct. 26 In Lawrence, the
Court concluded that there was such a right. 27
The Court's newfound understanding of what is protected by the liberty guarantee explicitly rested on asserted higher
law principles. In the opening paragraph, the Court stated,
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person
both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions. 28
This definition vastly expands on prior decisions in invoking transcendent principles and a right extending beyond spatial
bounds.

What Lawrence added to the rights analysis is a complete untethering of the meaning of liberty from any objective
standard. Significantly, the Court's reliance on “transcendent dimensions” to define liberty places unbridled discretion
in the Court to find new rights as it sees fit. For example, the Court stated that the founders “knew times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.” 29 Thus, an enlightened Court finds new meaning as each generation searches for greater freedom than the
prior generation.
*674 The Court did not define the scope or source of the transcendent dimensions. It did, however, draw upon several
sources in reaching its conclusion on the scope of liberty, which shed light on the fact that the meaning of liberty is based
on subjective, man-made determinations.
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First, the Court adopted an individualistic vision of the liberty guarantee insofar as each person has the “right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” 30 As long as each person
has the right to define one's own concept of existence and of the universe, liberty has an inherently subjective foundation.
Second, to help it decide whether the liberty guarantee prohibits criminalization of sodomy, the Court considered (i) what
foreign nations had decided with respect to rights based on same-sex sexual conduct and (ii) the changing views in this
nation during the fifty years preceding Lawrence. 31 Specifically, the Court explained that England had decriminalized
homosexual conduct in 1967 and the European Court of Human Rights in 1981 had held that the laws of Northern
Ireland that criminalized homosexual conduct were unconstitutional. 32 With respect to reliance on this nation's history
to determine the meaning of liberty, the Court explained that history and tradition were just a “starting point,” but
that the “laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance .... These references show an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex.” 33
If the scope of the liberty guarantee in the United States Constitution is based on principles that are defined by each
person, by foreign countries, and by standards that change and emerge, then, by definition, the standard is subjective
and changeable rather than objective and immutable. When the Supreme Court places itself as arbiter of the meaning of
a subjective and changeable definition of liberty, it has, as Arthur Leff warned, placed itself in the position of a god.
C. United States v. Windsor
Although Windsor did not invoke the same “transcendent” principles in its rationale, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
relied on the same principles of individual autonomy as Casey and Lawrence. Windsor also laid *675 the groundwork
for the Court's decision two years later in Obergefell that declared unconstitutional a state's definition of marriage as
the union of one man and one woman. 34
In Windsor, two women, who were New York residents, married in Canada in 2007. When Ms. Spyer died, Ms. Windsor
sought to claim the federal estate tax exemption that is available for surviving spouses. 35 After Windsor paid the
$363,053 estate tax, she sought a refund. 36 The Internal Revenue Service denied the exemption because Section 3 of
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined marriage, for purposes of all federal statutes, regulations, and
rulings, as the union of one man and one woman. 37
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the
various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 38
Thus, Windsor was not a surviving spouse.

Windsor filed suit in the Southern District of New York in November, 2010, claiming that DOMA violated the guarantee
of equal protection. 39 On February 23, 2011, while the tax refund suit was pending in the District Court, United States
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Attorney General Eric Holder notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives that “the President and I have
concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny and that, as applied to same-sex
couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.” 40
In that letter, Attorney General Holder admitted that “the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the appropriate level of
scrutiny for classifications *676 based on sexual orientation.” 41 The letter stated, however, that the Supreme Court has
“rendered a number of decisions that set forth the criteria that should inform this and any other judgment as to whether
heightened scrutiny applies ....” 42 The letter set forth an independent analysis of each of those factors and reached a
decision that neither the Supreme Court nor any federal Circuit Court had reached at the time--that sexual orientation
should be considered a suspect classification. 43 Applying heightened scrutiny, the letter concluded that DOMA was
unconstitutional. 44
The Attorney General notified the Speaker that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 530D, the Department of Justice (DOJ) would
no longer defend DOMA. 45 Pursuant to House Rule II.8, the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) voted
3-2 to intervene in the litigation to defend DOMA. 46 The District Court granted the BLAG's motion to intervene in
the case. 47
*677 Despite the fact that DOMA had been enacted in 1996 with wide, bipartisan support, and signed into law by
President Clinton, 48 there was significant public criticism of the BLAG's decision to use funds to defend the law. 49
If the BLAG had not voted to defend the law, however, the litigation would have continued in the trial court with no
real defense. 50
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, 51
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 52 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari review and instructed the parties to address two additional questions: (1) “whether the United States' agreement
with Windsor's legal position precludes further review” and (2) “whether BLAG has standing to appeal the case.” 53
Because all parties agreed that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under those circumstances, the Court
appointed another attorney, as amicus curiae, to argue the position that the Court lacked jurisdiction. 54
The Supreme Court concluded that the United States retained a sufficient stake in the litigation to satisfy Article III
jurisdiction. 55 Specifically, even though the Executive agreed with Windsor's legal argument, the United States had
continued to refuse to refund the estate *678 taxes sought by Windsor. 56 Thus, Windsor had been denied the tax relief
she sought. In addition to the Article III requirements, the Court explained that “prudential considerations demand
that the Court insist upon ‘that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”’ 57 That requirement can be satisfied even where
the named parties do not themselves present the adverseness. According to the Court in Windsor, the presence of the
BLAG and other amicus curiae prepared to defend the constitutionality of DOMA was sufficient to satisfy the prudential
concern with adverseness. 58
In concluding that it had Article III standing, the Court considered the fact that if it dismissed the case, other litigation
would ensue across the country raising the exact issue. In the meantime, the “[r]ights and privileges of hundreds of
thousands of persons would be adversely affected, pending a case in which all prudential concerns about justiciability
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are absent.” 59 Thus, despite the DOJ's refusal to defend the law, the Court found that the Article III requirements were
satisfied and prudential concerns warranted a conclusion that the Court had standing to hear the case. 60
The Court did express concern, however, over the “Executive's failure to defend the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress based on a constitutional theory not yet established in judicial decisions ....” 61
[I]f the Executive's agreement with a plaintiff that a law is unconstitutional is enough to preclude judicial
review, then the Supreme Court's primary role in determining the constitutionality of a law ... would become
only secondary to the President's. This would undermine the clear dictate of the separation-of-powers
principle that “when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, ‘[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law *679 is ....”’ Similarly, with respect
to the legislative power, when Congress has passed a statute and a President has signed it, it poses grave
challenges to the separation of powers for the Executive at a particular moment to be able to nullify
Congress' enactment solely on its own initiative and without any determination from the Court. 62
Although the Court acknowledged the “difficult choice” that an Executive faces when he personally believes a statute
is unconstitutional, 63 the Court explained that

there is no suggestion here that it is appropriate for the Executive as a matter of course to challenge statutes
in the judicial forum rather than making the case to Congress for their amendment or repeal. The integrity
of the political process would be at risk if difficult constitutional issues were simply referred to the Court
as a routine exercise. 64

Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, took the position in a dissenting opinion that the Court
should have dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing because the plaintiffs and Government “agree entirely on
what should happen in this lawsuit.” 65 He essentially characterizes the majority opinion as a “jaw-dropping” powergrab--the “assertion of judicial supremacy over the people's Representatives in Congress and the Executive.” 66 Justice
Scalia explained that when the parties are not adverse, and agree on the appropriate outcome, the Court is stripped of
the jurisdiction to hear the case. 67 “Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or appellant) who has standing to complain
but an opposing party who denies the validity of the complaint.” 68 In Windsor, the government did not deny the validity
of plaintiff's claims. However, if the Court had held that the BLAG lacked standing, the Executive branch would have
had the *680 ability to essentially repeal a validly-enacted law through non-defense of those laws in court.
As to the merits of the DOMA challenge, a five-member majority of the Court held that the federal definition of marriage
as the union of one man and one woman denied plaintiffs the “liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment” 69 by denying them equal protection of the laws. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy described
DOMA as an “indignity” 70 that imposed a “stigma” 71 upon and “demean[ed]” 72 same-sex couples. In contrast, Justice
Kennedy explained that a law must not be enacted based on “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group ....” 73 He further explained that is also could not be “motivated by an improper animus or purpose ....” 74 He then
concluded that DOMA violated those standards. 75 In contrast, Justice Kennedy characterized New York's decision to
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permit same-sex couples to marry as “responding ‘to the initiative of those who sought a voice in shaping the destiny of
their own times.”’ 76 The ability to shape one's destiny is consistent with Justice Kennedy's prior decisions finding a right
to autonomy that relies on Justice Kennedy's notion of transcendent principles.
Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito each wrote dissenting opinions. Justices Roberts and Scalia believed that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because there was no ongoing controversy to decide insofar as all named parties in
the case agreed on the proper outcome. 77 Justice Alito, on the other hand, would have found standing by the BLAG
in the limited circumstances where, as there, a court had struck the law down as unconstitutional and the Executive
declined to defend the law. 78 Justice Roberts spoke critically of the majority's willingness to “tar the political branches
with the brush of bigotry” without more “convincing evidence that the Act's principal purpose was to codify malice,
and that it furthered no legitimate government interests ....” 79 Justice Scalia similarly criticized *681 the majority's
characterization of the coordinate political branches. 80 He maintained that “[l]aying such a charge against them should
require the most extraordinary evidence ....” 81 Rather, Justice Scalia concluded that “[i]n the majority's judgment, any
resistance to its holding is beyond the pale of reasoned disagreement.” 82
Justice Scalia also predicted what would happen in Obergefell despite the majority opinion's assurances that the Windsor
decision had nothing to do with whether a state could constitutionally define marriage as the union of one man and
one woman. 83
It takes real cheek for today's majority to assure us, as it is going out the door, that a constitutional
requirement to give formal recognition to same-sex marriage is not at issue here--when what has preceded
that assurance is a lecture on how superior the majority's moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is
to the Congress's hateful moral judgment against it. 84

In a similar vein, Justice Alito took issue with the majority's willingness to exceed its proper role by predicating its opinion
on quintessential legislative decisions. 85 Echoing oft-repeated language by prior Supreme Court Justices of the need
to proceed cautiously in finding rights in the Constitution, he explained that judges should proceed with “both caution
and humility.” 86 He found that to be particularly true where, as in Windsor, the underlying issue implicated matters
in dispute among “social scientists, philosophers, and historians,” and thus, was a matter where “judges are certainly
not equipped to make such an assessment” of “what the long-term ramifications of widespread acceptance of same-sex
marriage will be.” 87 He took issue with the majority's belief that it could “arrogat[e] to ourselves the power to decide a
question that philosophers, historians, social scientists, and theologians are better qualified to explore.” 88
Justice Alito's dissenting opinion also accurately predicted how the Court would ultimately view those who opposed
same-sex marriage when the day *682 came for it to render a decision on the constitutionality of state marriage laws
defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman. “Acceptance of the argument [that DOMA is subject to
and violates heightened scrutiny] would cast all those who cling to traditional beliefs about the nature of marriage in
the role of bigots or superstitious fools.” 89
Finally, looking ahead to the day when the Court squarely addressed the question of the constitutionality of state
marriage laws defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman, he explained that he hoped the Court would
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decide, as it did in Windsor, that the question of marriage is one for the states to decide. 90 We now know that the Court
did not leave the question to the states.
D. Obergefell v. Hodges
In Obergefell, the Court had before it a consolidated appeal from separate cases challenging the constitutionality of the
marriage laws of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. 91 Each of those states defined marriage as the union of one
man and one woman. 92 The district courts in each of the cases ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the marriage laws
unconstitutional. 93 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consolidated those appeals and concluded
that the states had no constitutional requirement to permit same-sex couples to marry or to recognize same-sex marriages
from other jurisdictions. 94 The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear both issues. 95
The five-member majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, held that the marriage laws violated the substantive due
process and equal protection guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment and that there was no basis for a State to
refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in another State. 96 The majority opinion began with the premise that
the Constitution promises “liberty to all within its reach” and explained that liberty “includes certain specific rights that
allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.” 97 Justice Kennedy then offered the majority's
*683 view on how same-sex marriage is a right protected by that guarantee of liberty. He described marriage as having
“transcendent importance” in the annals of human history, with the “lifelong union of a man and a woman ... promis[ing]
nobility and dignity.” 98 The opinion described marriage as “essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations” and
acknowledged that marriage historically has been understood as consisting of two persons of the opposite sex. 99
Before launching into the due process analysis, the majority opinion made two assumptions that went to the heart of
the broader societal discussion about same-sex marriage. The opinion assumes that permitting same-sex marriage would
not “demean” marriage and, in fact, if that were petitioners' intent, their “claims would be of a different order.” 100 The
opinion also rested on the presumption that same-sex attractions are of an “immutable nature,” 101 which is a matter
very much in dispute among medical professionals. 102 The opinion also plainly articulated its judicial philosophy in
taking the position that the Court is free to find new rights in the Constitution over time as “new dimensions of freedom
become apparent to new generations ....” 103 That judicial philosophy stands in contrast with that of the dissenting
justices who believe that the *684 Constitution should be interpreted according to longstanding history and tradition,
with new protections afforded through the amendment process. 104
The majority articulated four principles and traditions that support its conclusion that same-sex marriage is a
fundamental right. First, the Court found that a “right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept
of individual autonomy.” 105 The Court compared a decision about whom to marry with rights previously found by
the Court to “contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing,” 106 The Court then made the moral
determination that “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry ....” 107
The second rationale offered by the majority was that “the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a twoperson union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.” 108 Although referring to the “twoperson” aspect of marriage, the Court's discussion of this principle focused on the intimate association rights announced
in the Court's prior cases dealing with contraception, the right of prisoners to marry, and same-sex sexual conduct. 109
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Although not expressly stated by the Court, the two-person rationale likely refers to same-sex marriage as the better
solution to supporting a long-term commitment between two people than, for example, civil unions or domestic
partnerships.
*685 The third basis for the decision “is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.” 110 Despite ongoing debate by social scientists and medical
professionals about the long-term effects on children raised in homes with two men or two women, the Court accepted
the proposition that same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to biological and adopted children. 111 The
Court relied on the fact that most states allow same-sex couples to adopt or foster. 112 According to the Court, without
same-sex marriage, children raised in those homes suffer stigma and material costs. The marriage laws preventing samesex couples from marrying “thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.” 113
A final basis for the Court's decision was that “the Nation's traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our
social order.” 114 That statement begs the questions that the Court left unanswered: what about marriage has made it a
keystone of our social order and does same-sex marriage advance those interests in the same manner as marriage between
one man and one woman? Justice Kennedy quoted (i) Alexis de Tocqueville, who found a connection between the strong
bonds found in the American family and the success of democracy in America and (ii) an 1888 Supreme Court decision
that concluded that marriage “is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.” 115 The Court explained that given the importance of marriage to society, “society pledge[s]
to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.” 116 States
have traditionally conferred upon married couples
an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities. These aspects of marital status
include: taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of
evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and *686 benefits
of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers'
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules. 117
The Court then went on to conclude that there is no difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples with respect to
this principle; a state's refusal to provide these benefits to same-sex couples “demeans gays and lesbians” because “[s]amesex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.” 118

Respondents had argued in the case that the Court should have framed the question as petitioners seeking the right to
same-sex marriage rather than the right to marry given that marriage has, as the Court acknowledged, been understood
in the annals of American history as the union of one man and one woman. 119 A majority of the Court disagreed,
explaining that although the right to marriage is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, “rights come not
from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives
define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” 120 Justice Kennedy pointed out that many who “deem same-sex
marriage to be wrong” do so “based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises ....” 121 The opinion,
however, maintained that when those sincere personal beliefs are enacted into law, “the necessary consequence is to put
the imprimatur of the state itself on the exclusion that soon demeans, or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then
denied.” 122 To deny the right to marriage “would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood ....” 123 For
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the same reasons that the marriage laws denied the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that
it violated the guarantees of equality. 124
The majority opinion concluded by staking out a moral position on same-sex marriage:
*687 No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity,
devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once
they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure
even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage.
Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves ....
They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right. 125

Each of the dissenting Justices wrote a separate opinion, which was joined by one or more other of the dissenting
Justices. 126 Justice Roberts made four points in his dissent. First, he criticized the majority for overstepping its role.
He explained that “[i]t can be tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the law”
and then took the position that the “majority today neglects that restrained conception of the judicial role.” 127 The
majority answered the question before it “not on neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own ‘understanding
of what freedom is and must become.”’ 128 To allow “unelected federal judges to select which unenumerated rights rank
as ‘fundamental'--and to strike down state laws on the basis of that determination--raises obvious concerns about the
judicial role.” 129 After surveying the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, including a discussion
of how the pendulum has swung back and forth over the years, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the majority's
“aggressive application of substantive due process breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns the Court to
the unprincipled approach of Lochner.” 130
*688 Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with the majority's reliance on the Court's privacy cases (Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Lawrence) “because petitioners do not seek privacy .... [T]hey seek public recognition of their relationships, along
with corresponding government benefits.” 131 Chief Justice Roberts also criticized the majority's attempt to minimize
the expansive definition it ascribed to the liberty guarantee.
To be fair, the majority does not suggest that its individual autonomy right is entirely unconstrained. The
constraints it sets are precisely those that accord with its own “reasoned judgment,” informed by its “new
insight” into the “nature of injustice,” which was invisible to all who came before but has become clear
“as we learn the meaning” of liberty .... The truth is that today's decision rests on nothing more than the
majority's own conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that
“it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right ....” Whatever force
that belief may have as a matter of moral philosophy, it has no more basis in the Constitution than did the
naked policy preferences adopted in Lochner. 132

Chief Justice Roberts explained that the purpose of insisting that unenumerated fundamental rights are rooted in the
history and tradition of our nation “is to ensure that when unelected judges strike down democratically enacted laws,
they do so based on something more than their own beliefs.” 133 The founders “would never have imagined” turning
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over decisions on matters of social policy to “unaccountable and unelected judges.” 134 Such a grab for power is a cause
for concern because “[t]he Court's accumulation of power does not occur in a vacuum. It comes at the *689 expense
of the people.” 135 The Court's role, Justice Roberts explained, is a modest and restrained judiciary that is “sensitive to
the fact that judges are unelected and unaccountable” and is “less pretentious than to suppose” that it was “chosen to
burst the bonds” of thousands of years of history and tradition.” 136
Justice Scalia wrote separately to decry the majority's power grab. He referred to the majority's opinion as evidence that
the new “Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.” 137 The
Court's decision represented “a naked judicial claim to legislative--indeed, super-legislative--power ....” 138 He explained
that judges are selected because of their skill as lawyers, not because of their policy views. He discussed the lack of
diversity among the Supreme Court Justices: all nine studied at Harvard or Yale Law School; eight of them grew up in
the east or west coasts; none are from the Southwest; and none are evangelical Christians or Protestants (despite these
faith traditions representing a large portion of the population). 139 “[T]o allow the policy question of same-sex marriage
to be considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even
more fundamental than no taxation without representation; no social transformation without representation.” 140 He
characterized the majority's opinion as “pretentious” and “egotistic.” 141
A key focus of Justice Thomas' dissent was on the majority's fundamental misconception of the source of human dignity.
Justice Thomas pointed out that our Declaration of Independence states that human dignity is innate whereas the
majority opinion suggests that human dignity is bestowed by the government. 142 “When the Founders proclaimed in
the Declaration of Independence that ‘all men are created equal’ and ‘endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights,’ they referred to a vision of mankind in which all humans are created in the image of God and therefore *690 of
inherent worth.” 143 As a result, “human dignity cannot be taken away by the government .... The government cannot
bestow dignity, and it cannot take it away.” 144 In contrast, the majority opinion repeatedly states that the marriage
laws either demeaned or denied dignity and that by permitting same-sex couples to marry government confers dignity
on that relationship. 145
Justice Alito highlighted his concerns with the majority opinion's impact on religious liberties. He asserted that the
majority opinion “will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.” 146 His belief
is based, in part, on the majority's comparison of the marriage laws to the laws that previously denied equal treatment
to African-Americans and women. “The implications of this analogy will be exploited by those who are determined
to stamp out every vestige of dissent.” 147 Rather than leaving the issue of marriage to the states, with states reaching
different results, the majority “impos[ed] its own views on the entire country,” which “facilitates the marginalization of
many Americans who have traditional ideas.” 148
E. Meaning of Transcendent Dimensions
That the Court is making itself the subjective arbiter of right and wrong becomes clearer given the meaning of the word
“transcendent.” Despite the Supreme Court's repeated use of the term, it does not appear in Black's Law Dictionary.
Webster's Dictionary, however, defines “transcendent” as “exceeding usual limits,” “extending or lying beyond the
limits of ordinary experience,” “being beyond the limits of all possible experience and knowledge” “being beyond
comprehension,” “transcending the universe of material existence,” and “universally applicable or significant.” 149 These
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*691 definitions of “transcendent” require someone to make value determinations as to what, for example, is “usual,”
“ordinary,” “beyond the limits of possible experience and knowledge,” and “universally acceptable.” When transcendent
principles are invoked to decide the constitutionality of an act, it requires a determination of right and wrong. If the
standard of right and wrong rests with a group of people in power, it can change over time and, therefore, is inherently
at risk of arbitrariness and inconsistency. 150 If, however, the standard of right and wrong rests on objective standards
of right and wrong, there is consistency and objectivity.
The Supreme Court's usage of “transcendent” outside the context of interpreting “liberty” highlights the idea, consistent
with the Webster's Dictionary definitions, that transcendent refers to a higher law concept, without explaining the
source of that higher law. For example, the Court has referred to free speech and academic freedom as “of transcendent
value.” 151 The right to a public jury trial is a “transcendent privilege” 152 and is guaranteed for the “transcendent
reason[s]” of “efficiency, competence, and integrity in the overall operation of the judicial system.” 153 The Court also
has referred to certain things as “of transcendent public good,” including the “President's physical safety” 154 and the
mental and physical health of the nation's citizenry. 155 The states similarly have a “transcendent interest” in protecting
the welfare of children. 156 The Court has referred to “transcendent legislative purposes” for certain legislation 157 and
to the “transcendent importance of the Bill of Rights to our society.” 158 Ensuring *692 that people have adequate
information about their government in order to govern themselves is “of transcendent importance.” 159
One dissenting opinion relied on a quote by Sir William Blackstone, where he referred to the king as having the “attributes
of a great and transcendent nature; by which the people are led to consider him in the light of a superior being, and to
pay him that awful respect, which may enable him with greater ease to carry on the business of the government.” 160
Finally, in Edwards v. Aguilard, where the Court decided the constitutionality of a state law that required creation and
evolution to both be taught whenever either was taught, the Court quoted Webster's definition of the doctrine of creation
as including the belief that the world was “created by a transcendent God out of nothing.” 161
The last two references expressly incorporate into the meaning of transcendent the idea that there is a superior being,
outside of mankind, that has established an objective, never-changing set of standards of right and wrong. In Federalist
No. 43, Madison stated that the compact among the states “can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the
parties” by “the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God ....” 162
Although the Court has not defined the meaning of transcendent principles, in order to be consistent and workable, the
reference to transcendent principles and values in a legal system based on the rule of law must be based on objective
standards of right and wrong. 163 As Professor Leff pointed out in Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, “[t]he moment
one suggests a criterion, then individual men have ceased to be the measure of all things.” 164 The Court, however,
invokes higher law principles while relying on man-made standards of right and wrong.
The Court's reliance on transcendent values begs two related questions. First, is it proper to rely on higher law principles
in deciding what terms such as liberty and freedom mean under the United States Constitution? As Arthur Leff
appropriately pointed out, it is impossible not to rely on such principles in a rule of law system. 165 Second, what is the
appropriate source *693 of higher law principles for the Court to rely on in interpreting the United States Constitution?
III. To WHAT HIGHER LAW PRINCIPLES SHOULD COURTS LOOK IN AMERICA?
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A. Non-Biblical Sources of a Higher Law are Inherently Subjective and, In Fact, Not Higher Law Principles
As mentioned above, “transcendent” is defined in the dictionary as something beyond human experience and
knowledge. 166 If a value determination is based on what a group or people believe is right or wrong then, by definition,
the standard is not transcendent and, therefore, not a higher law principle. For example, the Humanist Manifesto II
states that “moral values derive their source from human experience. Ethics is autonomous and situational needing no
theological or ideological sanction. Ethics stems from human need and interest.” 167 Inherent in this definition is that an
individual or group of people glean from human experience what should be declared right and wrong. As times change,
so too does the standard of what is right and wrong. The Humanist Manifesto plainly does not rest on transcendent
principles.
Some Supreme Court precedent highlights the subjectivity that has been infused into the constitutional interpretive
process. For example, the Court has adopted an “evolving standards of decency” standard to determine whether
government action violates the Eighth Amendment. The text of the Eighth Amendment provides that “cruel and
unusual punishments” shall not be “inflicted.” 168 Since early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has expressly
rejected the notion that the Eighth Amendment is to be interpreted according to the standards that prevailed when the
Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791. 169 Instead, the Supreme Court has tested the constitutionality of criminal
punishments--primarily the death *694 penalty--by asking whether the punishment imposed comports with “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 170 To determine what comports with the evolving
standards of decency, the Court considers “objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments
and state practice.” 171 As a result, the question of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment “necessarily embodies
a moral judgment” that “change[s] as the basic mores of society change.” 172 In fact, the Court also has expressly stated
that its “own independent judgment” plays a part in the determination of whether certain punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment. 173 Reliance on the independent judgment of the Court to determine whether the basic mores of society
have changed, resulting in an evolution of the standard of decency, is an inherently subjective process.
A similar, subjective standard was adopted in Lawrence. 174 Justice Kennedy first discussed the Court's decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the Court concluded that there was no constitutional right to engage in same-sex
sexual conduct. 175 Justice Burger explained in a concurring opinion in Bowers that “[d]ecisions of individuals
relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.
Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.” 176 Justice Kennedy
noted that the Bowers Court relied on longstanding history and tradition on the issue *695 of same-sex sexual conduct,
but then stated that only the “laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.” 177 He asserted that
the past fifty years “show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” 178 That emerging awareness was based on a strong reliance
on the 1955 Model Penal Code promulgated by the American Law Institute, which did not recommend or provide for
“criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private” 179 and on the fact that states had begun to
change their penal laws to conform the Model Penal Code. 180
Justice Kennedy then relied on foreign precedent and the trends in a minority of states to conclude that the Bowers Court
was wrong and that, indeed, there was a right for two people to engage in same-sex sexual conduct in the privacy of their
home. 181 He referred to these and other examples as the “emerging recognition” of same-sex relations. 182 The opinion
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then relied on Casey to bolster its conclusion that there is a constitutional right relating to marriage, procreation, and
family relations broad enough to cover same-sex sexual relations and on Romer to conclude that “equality of treatment”
demands respect for that same-sex sexual conduct. 183 These cases highlight that the judiciary has assumed the role of
deciding what is morally acceptable, which is inherently a subjective, legislative function. 184
In a 1977 Book Review, Arthur Leff echoed his premise from Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law that a rule-based
system is inherently *696 arbitrary when it rests on man-made determinations of right and wrong. 185 “[W]hat must be,
even if it must be for everyone, is ‘good’ only if some evaluator so sets things up by defining ‘the good” to be ‘that which
must be for everyone.”’ 186 Professor Leff explained in Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law that a system without an
objective standard of right and wrong either makes each person morally autonomous and free to do whatever the person
desires or it denies full individual autonomy by placing an individual or group in power to determine right and wrong
for everyone. 187 Justice Kennedy invokes higher law principles to suggest the Court's reliance on universal, objective
“oughts,” but the decisions have actually turned on the subjective determination of a majority of the Court.
B. Our Founding Documents Point to an Objective Source of Higher Law Principles
Justice Kennedy's reliance on higher law principles is not entirely misplaced. Significantly, the founders intended for our
laws to be based on a higher law. Justice Kennedy, however, has invoked higher law principles while attempting to base
that higher law on something that is the antithesis of a higher law; he has adopted an interpretive doctrine that rests
entirely on mankind as the alleged source of higher law. By definition, a man-made standard is not a higher law standard.
As long as you wanted simultaneously to make something in the world--mankind-- into the good and still
reserve the right to judge its goodness, you were doomed. You were trapped in what, to save time, I might
call a Gödel problem: how to validate the premises of a system from within itself. “Good,” “right” and
words like that are evaluations. For evaluations you need an evaluator .... From the world, only a man can
evaluate a man, and unless some arbitrary standards are slipped into the game, all men, at this, are equal.

....

[B]y dispensing with God we did more than just free ourselves of some intellectual anachronism. We also
dispensed with the only intellectually respectable answer to the ultimate “Why is it right to do X?” 188
*697 Professor Leff concluded his book review with the following thought: “If there is no God, everything is permitted;
if there is a God, it's even more terrifying, because then some things are not permitted, and men have got to find out
which are which.” 189

The Declaration of Independence lays out that God's standards of right and wrong are to inform our understanding of
the guarantee of liberty.
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1. The Declaration of Independence
As its name implies, the Declaration of Independence declared to the world the reasons the colonies were led to take the
bold, defiant step of declaring independence from their King. The signers explained,
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands
which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and
equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions
of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to separation. 190
Not only did the signers seek to declare to the world the just causes for their declaration of independence from the King,
but they specifically laid before the “Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of [their] intentions” in declaring the
independence. 191

Before identifying the specific reasons for their declaration of independence, the signers articulated foundational
principles they believed were necessary for proper government, which principles the King had violated. The signers stated
that there were certain “self-evident” truths, including that (i) all men are created equal, (ii) all men are “endowed, by
their Creator, with certain unalienable Rights,” among which are “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” (iii) to
secure the rights endowed to man by their Creator, “Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed,” and (iv) “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government ....” 192
*698 At least four biblical principles can be derived from the above-quoted language. First, the signers were establishing
their new government on rights rooted in the “Laws of Nature and of Nature's God.” The three thinkers most cited by the
Founders were Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Locke and the most cited source was the Bible. 193 In his Commentaries
on the Laws of England, which is considered the most famous treatise on common law, 194 Blackstone discussed the
relationship between positive law and the laws of nature and nature's God. 195 He described the law of nature as the
“will of his Maker.” 196 The law of nature refers to
eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the Creator Himself in all his Dispensations conforms ....
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God Himself is of course superior in
obligation to any other. It is binding all over the globe in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are
of any validity, if contrary to this. 197
He further explained that all human laws depend on the two foundations of the law of nature and the law of revelation:
“that is to say, no human law should be suffered to contradict these.” 198 The law of nature is contrasted by Blackstone
with the law of nature's God, which is the revealed law “to be found only in the Holy Scriptures.” 199

In The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu similarly stated his belief that all law has its source in God. “God is related to the
universe, as Creator and Preserver; the laws by which He created all things are those by which He preserves them.” 200
He ridiculed the idea that man-made standards were the final arbiter of right and wrong: “To say that there is nothing
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just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that before the describing of
a circle all the radii were not equal.” 201 “Man, as *699 a physical being, is like other bodies governed by invariable
laws .... established by God.” 202
John Locke also frequently cited the Bible in his writings. In his first treatise on government, he cited the Bible eighty
times, with forty-two of the citations from the book of Genesis. 203 He directly addressed the idea of a higher law, outside
man, that established norms of right and wrong.
Human Laws are measures in respect of Men whose Actions they must direct, albeit such measures they
are as have also their higher Rules to be measured by, which Rules are two, the Law of God, and the
Law of Nature; so that Laws Human must be made according to the general Laws of Nature, and without
contradiction to any positive Law of Scripture, otherwise they are ill made. 204

Hugo Grotius was also frequently cited by the founders. 205 He believed that God's laws were superior to any manmade laws:
Among all good men one principle at any rate is established beyond controversy, that if the authorities issue
any order that is contrary to the law of nature or to the commandments of God, the order should not be
carried out. For when the Apostles said that obedience should be rendered to God rather than men, they
appealed to an infallible rule of action, which is written in the hearts of all men. 206

Contrary to modern ideas of natural law, the law of nature is “dictated by God himself,” written on mankind's heart,
and must be consistent with Scripture. 207 “Nature's God,” as explained by Blackstone, referred to the revealed law of
Scripture. Thus, the signers, in relying on the “Laws of *700 Nature and of Nature's God,” declared their reasons for
independence resting firmly on rights rooted in the laws of nature and nature's God.
Second, the Declaration of Independence makes clear the founders' belief that mankind is endowed by a CreatorGod with certain unalienable rights. This fact is significant because it limits the authority of civil government in two
key respects. Significantly, because God, not government, gives people rights, civil government does not have proper
authority to strip people of those God-given rights. Justice Thomas affirmed this understanding in his Obergefell dissent:
Human dignity has long been understood in this country to be innate. When the Framers proclaimed in the
Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in which all humans are created in the image of
God and therefore of inherent worth. That vision is the foundation upon which this Nation was built. The
corollary of that principle is that human dignity cannot be taken away by the government. 208
In contrast, a government based on the concept that government decides what rights mankind has is a government that
can strip people of those transient rights. 209 In addition, recognizing that each human being is endowed with certain
rights by a Creator-God limits government's attempts to ascribe different values to different people--all are endowed with
the same, unalienable rights. Stated differently, God, not government, establishes the inherent value of all mankind. 210
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Third, the Declaration of Independence affirms that there are self-evident, non-changing truths; in other words, there
are absolute truths. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court once explained,
*701 No free government now exists in the world, unless where Christianity is acknowledged, and is the
religion of the country. So far from Christianity, as the counsel contends, being part of the machinery
necessary to despotism, the reverse is the fact. Christianity is part of the common law of this state. It is not
proclaimed by the commanding voice of any human superior, but expressed in the calm and mild accents of
customary law. Its foundations are broad and strong, and deep; they are laid in the authority, the interest,
the affections of the people. Waiving all questions of hereafter, it is the purest system of morality, the firmest
auxiliary, and only stable support of all human laws. 211
That view of the common law's reliance on absolute truths stands in direct contrast with the humanist perspective that
truth changes and evolves over time based on man's reasoning and experience. 212 In his 1917 dissenting opinion in
Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 213 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes epitomized the humanist view on the source of
truth in proclaiming that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified ....” 214 Contrary to Justice Holmes' belief, the American legal system,
however, is one that rests on objective values and principles that do not change over time.

Fourth, the Declaration affirms the biblical principle that civil government derives its authority from Scripture. The
Declaration states that whenever civil government becomes destructive of protecting the people's God-given rights, the
people have a right and duty to throw off the government. 215 That declaration is entirely consistent with Romans 13,
*702 which states that civil “authorities ... have been established by God” 216 and “[t]hey are God's servants, agents
of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” 217 When civil authorities act contrary to Scripture, they act outside
their delegated authority. Scholar Herman Belz explained that:
Western political thought was premised on the idea of fundamental or higher law. In this approach, human
agency is understood to be subject to order and direction by divine or natural law. The existence of political
institutions and the power they exercise requires justification and legitimation according to the measure of
external standards of justice and right, which possess superior moral and legal authority by virtue of their
origin in the fundamental law of God or nature. 218
If, as this Article suggests, the biblical foundation set forth in the Declaration of Independence is the same foundation
on which the Constitution rests, all four of these points are particularly relevant to the question of whether the Court in
Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell properly interpreted the liberty guarantee in the Constitution.

2. The United States Constitution
The U.S. Constitution must be interpreted consistently with the Declaration. One scholar has analogized the relationship
between the Declaration and Constitution to the articles of incorporation and bylaws of a corporation. 219 In the
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corporate setting, the articles of incorporation set forth the purposes of the entity; the articles bring the entity into
existence. 220 The bylaws, in contrast, lay out the corporate structure and define the rules *703 and regulations that
will govern the entity. 221 Bylaws are to be read consistently with the corresponding articles of incorporation. 222
The Supreme Court has affirmed that the two should be read in conjunction, referring to the Constitution as the “body
and letter” of the law and the Declaration as the “thought and the spirit” of the law, explaining that “it is always safe to
read the letter of the constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.” 223 The founders' words and actions
affirm their reliance on biblical truths in drafting the Declaration and Constitution.
Although many books have been written discussing the founders' beliefs that our Constitution rested on biblical
principles, it bears mentioning a few examples for purposes of this article. 224 On June 28, 1787, when the Constitutional
Convention was on the brink of failure, Dr. Benjamin Franklin, who was eighty-one years old at the time, spoke,
reminding the delegates that they needed to ask God's assistance and blessing if they intended to successfully create a
new form of government.
The small progress we have made after four or five weeks ... with each other ... is methinks a melancholy
proof of the imperfection of the human understanding .... In this situation *704 of this Assembly, groping
as it were in the dark to find political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented to us, how
has it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying to the Father of lights to
illuminate our understandings?

In the beginning of the contest with Great Britain, when we were sensible of danger, we had daily prayers in
this room for the Divine protection. Our prayers, Sir, were heard and they were graciously answered. All of
us who were engaged in the struggle must have observed frequent instances of a superintending Providence
in our favor .... Have we now forgotten that powerful Friend? Or do we imagine we no longer need His
assistance?

I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth: that God
governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probably
that an empire can rise without His aid? We have been assured, Sir, in the Sacred Writings that “except
the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it (Psalm 127:1).” I firmly believe this, and I also
believe that without His concurring aid we shall succeed in this political building no better than the builders
of Babel. We shall be divided by our little partial local interests; our projects will be confounded and we
ourselves shall become a reproach and bye word down to future ages. I therefore beg leave to move that,
henceforth, prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven and its blessing on our deliberation be held in this
assembly every morning ... and that one or more of the clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that
service. 225

President George Washington echoed these sentiments in his inaugural address to Congress where he referred to “that
Almighty Being who rules over the Universe,” the “invisible hand which conducts the Affairs of men,” and his belief
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that “the propitious smiles of Heaven can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and
right which Heaven itself has ordained.” 226
*705 In 1892, after referring to several state court decisions and founding documents, the Supreme Court stated that
“[t]hese, and many other matters might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic
utterances that this is a Christian nation.” 227 James Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance of 1785, explained
that “religion ... [is] the basis and foundation of government .... Before any man can be considered as a member of
civil society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe ....” 228 In 1952, by joint resolution of
Congress and signed by President Truman, Congress created the National Day of Prayer. 229
The Constitution's division of power into three branches of government rests upon the biblical principle that as a result
of the fall, mankind is inherently sinful. 230 In Federalist No. 51, James Madison discusses his defense for the checks
and balances between the different branches of government.
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place, oblige it to control itself. 231

The doctrine of separation of powers has long been rooted at the core of our nation's system of government. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the
minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.” 232 The
framers believed “[the] accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one,
a few or many, and whether *706 hereditary, self-appointed, or elective may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.” 233 Thus, to protect against the risk of tyranny, it is crucial that the established branches of government
be separate and distinct from one another. In addition to deterring tyrannical rule, specific allocation of powers serves
to create an “effective and accountable” National Government. 234 Such precise delineation of responsibilities amongst
branches enables citizens to identify who is responsible for making, or failing to make, various decisions. 235
One of the major concerns of the Antifederalists was the federal judiciary, specifically the Supreme Court. They feared
that the “supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all other power in the government, and subject
to no control.” 236 To support this fear, they explained that the judges had been made completely independent:
There is no power above them, to control any of their decisions. There is no authority that can remove
them, and they cannot be controlled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the
people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon
feel themselves independent of heaven itself. 237
In Antifederalist Paper, Brutus 11, there was much concern about the precedent of the British judiciary expanding their
jurisdiction contrary to legislation. 238 The Antifederalists feared the American judiciary would likewise expand their
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jurisdiction, especially since there was nothing in the Constitution that expressly prohibited it. 239 A dire warning was
pronounced in Antifederalist Paper, Brutus 15:

*707 Perhaps nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state governments
than the constitution of the judicial. They will be able to extend the limits of the general government
gradually, and by insensible degrees, and to accommodate themselves to the temper of the people. Their
decisions on the meaning of the constitution will commonly take place in cases which arise between
individuals, with which the public will not be generally acquainted; one adjudication will form a precedent
to the next, and this to a following one. These cases will immediately affect individuals only; so that a
series of determinations will probably take place before even the people will be informed of them .... If the
states remonstrated, the constitutional mode of deciding upon the validity of the law, is with the supreme
court, and neither people, nor state legislatures, nor the general legislature can remove them or reverse their
decrees .... A constitution is a compact of a people with their rulers; if the rulers break the compact, the
people have a right and ought to remove them and do themselves justice ... but when this power is lodged in
the hands of men independent of the people, and of their representatives, and who are not, constitutionally,
accountable for their opinions, no way is left to controul them but with a high hand and an outstretched
arm. 240

The Federalists responded to the concerns of their fellow patriots with assurances that the judiciary was sufficiently
constrained and presented no threat to liberty. In Federalist Paper No. 81, Hamilton responded by suggesting the
concerns were “made up altogether of false reasoning upon misconceived fact.” 241 Although admitting that the
Constitution ought to be the standard, Hamilton points out that there is “not a syllable in the plan under consideration
which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or which
gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every State.” 242 He went on to say
the “supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority” is “in reality a phantom.” 243 To show
how unfounded the Antifederalists' concern was, he explained:
*708 Particular misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the legislature may now and then
happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience, or in any sensible degree
to affect the order of the political system. This may be inferred with certainty, from the general nature of
the judicial power, from the objects to which it relates, from the manner in which it is exercised, from its
comparative weakness, and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And the inference
is greatly fortified by the consideration of the important constitutional check which the power of instituting
impeachments in one part of the legislative body, and of determining upon them in the other, would give to
that body upon the members of the judicial department. This is alone a complete security. There never can
be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would
hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the means of
punishing their presumption, by degrading them from their stations. 244
The Federalists viewed the judiciary as the weakest of the three branches and believed it could never threaten liberty:
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Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in
which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy
or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The
legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every
citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely *709 judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. 245

It is the role of the courts to “declare the sense of the law” but “if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.” 246 It
is this view of the Judiciary that gave the Federalists confidence that the Constitution provided the necessary protections:
For I agree, that “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers.” And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary
alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments .... 247

It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice,
the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary
remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. 248

Thomas Jefferson also explained the reason to fear the threat to liberty posed by the judiciary:
The germ of dissolution of our federal government is in the constitution of the judiciary; an irresponsible
body working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing
its noiseless step like a thief, over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the states, and the
judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions is a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one
which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. 249

The value judgments that the Supreme Court exercised in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Lawrence v. Texas, and other
cases, is far removed from the Federalists' views of on the limited role of the judiciary. As Justice Scalia stated in his
dissent in Casey:
*710 As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing essentially lawyers'
work up here--reading text and discerning our society's traditional understanding of that text-the public
pretty much left us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about.
But if ... our pronouncement of constitutional law rests primarily on value judgments, then a free intelligent
people's attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different .... If, indeed, the “liberties”
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protected by the Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined and unbounded, then the people should
demonstrate, to protest that we do not implement their values instead of ours .... Value judgments, after all,
should be voted on, not dictated .... 250

Accumulation of legislative powers by the judiciary through expanding, subjective notions of the constitutional
guarantees stand in contrast with the rule of law system upon which the U.S. legal system is built. 251 Rule of law is
a phrase “often used but difficult to define.” 252 It is frequently described as a government of laws, not of men. 253
That understanding is consistent with Samuel Rutherford's 1644 work entitled Lex, Rex--The Law and the Prince, which
articulated the governmental philosophy that the “law is king” (lex rex) as compared to the king as the law (rex lex). 254
The Magna Carta is often cited as a significant victory for the rule of law because King *711 John acknowledged in
writing that both he and his subjects were subject to the law. 255
The most recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines the “rule of law” as the “supremacy of regular as opposed
to arbitrary power” and includes the idea “that every person is subject to the ordinary law within the jurisdiction.” 256
The sixth edition of the Black's Law Dictionary stated it slightly differently as “the supremacy of law; provides that
decisions should be made by application of known principles or laws without the intervention of discretion in their
application.” 257 One author characterized it this way:
In essence, rule of law refers to having rules that are established, known, accepted, and respected--by
both government and nongovernment actors. Rule of law invokes a predictable legal system with fair,
transparent, and effective judicial institutions to protect citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority
and lawless acts. Rule of law also implies a set of procedures and processes for the resolution of disputes
that are accessible and fair to all. 258

The American Bar Association Division for Public Education has published materials discussing the meaning of the rule
of law. Key aspects of the discussion paper included the following ideas:
• “[N]o one person is able to gain absolute power and stand above the law”; 259

• “[A] person's fate should not be in the hands of a single individual”; 260

*712 • The need in a republican form of government for respect of the laws; 261

• That chaos ensues when every individual is free to determine for himself what is law; 262
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• That “the laws must not be arbitrary”; 263

• The rule of law is “intended to promote stability”; 264 and

• That “people can expect predictable results from the legal system.” 265

The ABA Paper also referred to The World Justice Project's working definition of the rule of law, as comprising four
principles. Those principles included “[a] system of self-government in which all persons, including the government, are
accountable under the law” and “[a] system based on fair, publicized, broadly understood and stable laws.” 266 John
Locke similarly explained,
Freedom of men under government, is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that
society ... a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject
to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man. 267

The separation of powers built into American system is based on a foundational premise that governmental authority is
necessarily limited. 268 *713 Key aspects of a limited government are that decision makers are bound by express and
certain constitutional standards and restricted to acting within their delegated authority. 269 Writing in the Federalist
Papers, James Madison explained that in structuring the system of government, the branches must be constructed such
that ambition of one branch can counteract the ambition of another. 270 He further cautioned that “[t]he accumulation of
all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” 271
The antithesis, then, of a limited government is a “unitary and centralized government, or a government in which all
the functions or functionaries were concentrated in a single office.” 272 Such a government would be one “that invited
despotism and would inevitably become tyrannical and corrupt.” 273 Thus, the separation of powers that exists in our
state and federal governments is a “means to certain ends,” which includes “preservation of political liberty ....” 274 The
Supreme Court's decisions in Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell involved subjective determinations of right and wrong,
based on ever-changing standards; contrary to the Court's assertion that its decisions are a preservation of liberty, they
are a threat to liberty.
*714 III. THE DECISIONS IN CASEY, LAWRENCE, AND OBERGEFELL REFLECT A REX LEX
APPROACH TO THE LAW THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH TRANSCENDENT PRINCIPLES ROOTED IN
THE LAWS OF NATURE AND NATURE'S GOD
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If Justice Kennedy had properly applied transcendent principles to decide Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell, the decisions
would have been different. In each case, the Court determined the scope of the liberty guarantee in the Fourteenth
Amendment and in each case, the majority opinion expressed its reliance on transcendent principles to justify the
decisions reached. Had Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinions in each of those cases, properly understood
the source of transcendent principles, he would have had to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment does not include
any right to abortion, same-sex sexual conduct, or same-sex marriage.
A. Casey Revisited
The Declaration of Independence rests upon the Genesis account of how this earth and all of its inhabitants came
into existence--that we are “created” beings whose “Creator” endowed us with certain unalienable rights. 275 Scripture
explains that we are created in our Creator's image. 276 Our Creator knew us before we were even born and knit us
together in our mother's womb. 277 That understanding of our origins forms the basis of Justice Thomas's dissent in
Obergefell where he explained that government does not confer or take away one's dignity; rather, we have inherent
dignity because we are created by our Creator. 278
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that abortion destroys a “living organism” but somehow distinguishes that “living
organism” from a “person.” 279 As a result, that “living organism,” which undeniably becomes a human life if not
aborted, is left without the legal protections afforded under the Constitution until after birth. Only then does that “living
*715 organism” become a “person” who obtains the unalienable rights that we are endowed with by our Creator,
including the right to life, liberty, and property. 280 The Casey Court stated that before birth, the State has an interest
in “protecting the ... life of the fetus that may become a child.” 281 Somehow, the Court states that it is not taking
contradictory positions in asserting that the fetus is a living being and, yet, a woman can abort that living being. 282 In
reality, it is a false distinction and an issue beyond the competency of mankind. 283 A human life is endowed with the
right to life because he is created in the image of God, not because he magically transforms into a “person” at birth.
Scripture repeatedly describes God making, forming, and knitting together babies in the womb. 284
The Casey Court was willing to affirm the right to abortion even while suggesting that the decision in Roe might have
been in error. 285 This is troubling given that the Roe Court stated that it did “not resolve the difficult question of when
life begins,” yet went on to conclude that the woman has a right to destroy what may or may not be a life. 286 If the
Court was not competent to decide when life begins, and thus whether the fetus is a human life prior to birth, then it
should have erred on the side of protecting that fetus. Instead, the Court refused to decide when life begins and found
a right to destroy what may or may not constitute life, while protecting a state's interest after viability of the potential
life. 287 The legal inconsistencies are magnified by state fetal homicide laws.
At least thirty-eight states have fetal homicide laws that criminalize harm caused to a fetus. 288 At least twenty-eight of
those states impose criminal *716 penalties at any point post-conception. 289 Many of the states with fetal homicide
laws define the fetus as an “unborn child” or “person.” 290 Some courts have also held a fetus to be an unborn child in
the context of proceedings in juvenile court to protect the unborn child from the mother's neglect. 291 One New York
Family Court explained that “[m]aking a child endure an unsafe environment in the womb is ludicrous when this same
child is afforded protection from illegal drugs and an unsafe environment the moment it takes its first breath outside
the womb.” 292
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These decisions and laws recognizing that a fetus is an unborn child are consistent with biblical references indicating that
the babies in the womb are human lives. For example, the Bible refers to people who expressed their desire that God had
killed them within the womb, 293 a baby grabbing his brother by the heel in the womb, 294 and a baby leaping for joy
while still in the womb. 295 A right to abortion--to destroy human life-- stands in conflict with the biblical admonitions
not to murder or shed innocent blood. 296 Human life is at its most innocent pre-birth.
The Casey Court should have relied on the basic premise of the Declaration of Independence that we are created by a
Creator with certain unalienable rights, including life. No one contends that a fetus is born as anything but a human.
Thus, that fetus that is declared a human after birth is a human before birth, albeit in various stages of development.
Relying on *717 the transcendent principles rooted in the laws of nature and nature's God, the Casey Court should
have answered the question left unanswered in Roe--when life begins--and found that an unborn fetus is a life entitled
to the guarantee of life afforded persons under the Constitution.
Instead, the Court interpreted the liberty guarantee to be a license for pregnant women to do whatever they desire in
their quest “to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” 297
Liberty, however, must be tethered to an objective standard to keep the Court from delving into the policy-making
realm reserved for the legislature. 298 Webster's first American Dictionary defined liberty as “freedom from restraint, in
a general sense, and applicable to the body, or to the will or mind.” 299 “Natural liberty” is then defined as “the power
of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, except from the laws of nature.” 300 The meaning of liberty
should be tethered to the laws of nature and nature's God, which, as Blackstone described represents the revealed law
of God. 301 As a result, one does not have the constitutional liberty to do that which is contrary to the laws of nature
and of nature's God. 302
The revealed law of God plainly declares life to begin within the womb, that God (not man) is the creator of life, and
that government has the responsibility to protect the most innocent and vulnerable. The Court's decisions that a woman
has a right under the guarantee of liberty to destroy unborn life cannot be squared with the higher law principles to
protect innocent life. Casey should have reversed Roe and concluded that there is no right to abortion. Justice Kennedy's
pronouncement to the contrary, while ostensibly relying on transcendent principles, manifests his belief that man is the
standard of right and wrong. If man is the standard, and that standard changes as times change, then the consistency
and objectivity needed to preserve the rule of law does not exist.
*718 B. Lawrence and Obergefell Revisited
The Court in Lawrence and Obergefell collectively held that the liberty guarantee protected a right of same-sex sexual
conduct and a right of same-sex couples to marry. 303 If the Court had understood the right of liberty to be rooted in the
laws of nature and nature's God, Lawrence would have affirmed Bowers and Obergefell would have affirmed the laws in
the majority of states that described marriage as the union of one man and one woman.
From a “law of nature and nature's God” perspective, same-sex sexual conduct cannot be declared a protected right any
more than adultery 304 or sexual relations before marriage between opposite-sex couples. 305 Romans 1:25-27 explains
how God allowed people to reap the results of their sinful decisions to rebel against God, including the sins of sexual
impurity and exchanging “natural relations for unnatural [relations].” 306 The unnatural relations were described as
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women exchanging natural relations with men for unnatural relations with women as well as men abandoning natural
relations with women and being inflamed with lust for other men. 307
A biblical understanding of marriage also recognizes that it is a holy ordinance, instituted by God 308 and not an
institution that is subject to redefinition by mankind. The institution of marriage is reflective of Christ's relationship with
His church, with Christ as the bridegroom and the *719 Church as the bride. 309 An understanding that liberty is the
right to do what one ought, 310 rather than what one desires, would have led the Court to reach the opposite conclusions
in Lawrence and Obergefell.
The stark contrast that exists between those who believe mankind defines rights and those who believe God is the source
of our rights, is manifest in Obergefell. Justice Kennedy characterized laws that defined marriage as the union of one man
and one woman as disparaging, 311 stigmatizing, 312 denying same-sex couples dignity, 313 demeaning them, 314 and
disrespecting them. 315 He concluded that those laws denying same-sex couples the right to marry, therefore, infringed
on their right to make “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy ....” 316
In contrast, relying on the founding principles of this nation, Justice Thomas understands that God is the source of our
dignity and rights. 317 As a result, nothing government does can strip us of our God-given dignity. Laws can infringe on
our God-given rights, but mankind lacks authority to strip us of our dignity. Similarly, it is God who confers unalienable
rights. Those rights must, therefore, be consistent with the principles articulated by God. To refuse to allow same-sex
couples to marry certainly impinges on that couple's choice to have their relationship validated by the state, but it cannot
possibly infringe upon any God-given unalienable right that the couple has. If liberty is properly understood as the right
to do what one ought, not necessarily anything one might want, it is clear that the Court was wrong in Lawrence and
Obergefell.
As the dissenting opinions make plain in Obergefell, the majority's willingness to usurp legislative powers for itself and
decree rights based on *720 the personal wishes of the majority (all the while relying on some asserted transcendent
principles) is a threat to the rule of law in America.
The opinion in these cases is the furthest extension in fact--and the furthest extension one can even imagine-of the Court's claimed power to create “liberties” that the Constitution and its Amendments neglect to
mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied
(as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in
the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves. 318

IV. CONCLUSION
The checks and balances have not worked the way the founders envisioned. Perhaps for reasons of political expediency,
the Court has adopted a might makes right philosophy. Since Griswold's pronouncement of a privacy right lingering
in the shady penumbras of the Constitution that guaranteed a right to contraception, the Court has arrogated to itself
the authority to amend the Constitution through new interpretations of the constitutional guarantees. If the Court now
possesses the authority to amend the Constitution on the vote of five Justices, it necessarily limits the amendment power
conferred on the people in the Constitution. It also necessarily makes all Americans subject to the whim and desires of
those unelected Justices.
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The Court's new interpretations of the constitutional guarantees also have untethered our nation from its founding
principles. There is always an ultimate arbiter of what is right and what is wrong. If that ultimate arbiter is in the form of
five Justices of the Supreme Court who can constantly bring new meaning to the words of the text, then we are subject
to the arbitrary and inconsistent determinations of those in power. The rule of law, however, demands consistency and
rejects the idea that anyone is above the law. Professor Leff warned of the very crisis which currently faces our nation.
With the coordinate federal branches having abdicated their responsibility to check each other, the states now have to
choose whether to perform their duties in a federalist system to push back an overreaching national government.
Benjamin Franklin is quoted as saying to a woman he met outside the constitutional convention that the founders had
given us a republican form *721 of government, if we could keep it. 319 Perhaps now, more than any other point in
the nation's history since the civil war, the nation is faced with a decision about its identity and foundational principles.
America stands at a crossroads. It can either choose the path the founders chose for the nation as the best preservation of
liberty, which would require a return to principles of federalism, rule of law, and limited government, or it can choose the
path of so many other nations that have had their history marred by revolutions as competing factions seek to control
the nation.
To restore the rule of law, the Supreme Court must be reined in: it can no longer be permitted to make public policy
determinations under the guise of legal determinations, and it cannot continue to redefine the constitutional guarantees
by invoking higher law principles when, in reality, it is making subjective determinations of right and wrong. If Benjamin
Franklin were alive today, he likely would announce that the nation had, in fact, failed to keep the government the
founders developed. It is time to return to the principles of limited government and separation of powers, and recognize
that there are indeed transcendent principles that stand as an objective standard of right and wrong against which all
man-made laws should be judged.
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Id. at 858 (“Even on the assumption that the central holding of Roe was in error, that error would go only to the strength of the
state interest in fetal protection, not to the recognition afforded by the Constitution to the woman's liberty.”); id. at 869 (“A
decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law.”).

18

Id. at 865.

19

Id. at 851.

20

Id. at 850.

21

In support of its conclusion that Roe should be affirmed, the Court stated that absent such a right, the State's interest in
“population control, or eugenics” could justify a State's decision to force a woman to abort her unborn child. Casey, 505
U.S. at 859.

22

Id. at 901.

23

Dean Herbert W. Titus explained that “[t]o claim that one has the right to define one's own meaning, existence, universe, and
the mystery of human life is to claim that one is God.” Herbert W. Titus, Defining Marriage and the Family, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS J. 327, 338 (1994); see also U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth the process to amend the Constitution).

24

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).

25

Id. at 564.

26

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

27

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
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28

Id. at 562 (emphasis added).

29

Id. at 579.

30

Id. at 574.

31

Id. at 571-72.

32

Id. at 572.

33

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.

34

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex
couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”).

35

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).

39

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.

40

Press Release, Department of Justice, Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense
of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defensemarriage-act.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Section 530D provides that the Attorney General
shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General ... determines ... to refrain (on the grounds
that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the
constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute ... or not to appeal or request review of any judicial, administrative,
or other determination adversely affecting the constitutionality of any such provision ....
28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B) (2012).
In Windsor, the Supreme Court mentioned that the § 530D letter in that case was unique because it had been issued before
any adverse judgment against the law. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. In the past, the DOJ had submitted § 530D letters after
a court had already ruled against the government. Id.
This case is unusual, however, because the § 530D letter was not preceded by an adverse judgment. The letter instead reflected
the Executive's own conclusion, relying on a definition still being debated and considered in the courts, that heightened equal
protection scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation.
Id. at 2683-84.

46

Molly K. Hooper, House Leaders Vote to Intervene in DOMA Defense, THE HILL (Mar. 9, 2011, 10:43 PM), http://
thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/148521-house-leaders-vote-to-intervene-in-doma-defense.

47

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
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48

See the legislative tracking report at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr3396 (passed by 79 percent of the House
and 85 percent of the Senate).

49

Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Democratic Leader, Pelosi Statement on Speaker Boehner's Waste of $1.5 Million in
Taxpayer Dollars Defending DOMA (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/pelosi-statement-speakerboehners-waste-1-5-million-taxpayer-dollars-defending-doma/; Andrew Rosenthal, G.O.P. Wastes Taxpayer Dollars,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/g-o-p-wastes-taxpayer-dollars/?
_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (The Opinion Pages) (“[T]hey seem to relish spending taxpayer dollars on the plainly
unconstitutional Defense of Marriage Act.”).

50

The constitutionality of a duly enacted law should not be decided on a default when the only basis for refusing to defend in an
official's personal beliefs that the law is unconstitutional. See Rena M. Lindevaldsen, The Erosion of the Rule of Law When a
State Attorney General Refuses to Defend the Constitutionality of Controversial Laws, 21 BARRY L. REV. 1 (2015) (explaining
that an attorney general lacks discretion to refuse to defend the constitutionality of duly-enacted laws absent express, patent
unconstitutionality of the law).

51

Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

52

Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).

53

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).

54

Id. at 2684.

55

Id. at 2686.

56

Id. Although not an issue in Windsor, if the United States had granted her refund, contrary to the law, arguably no one
would have had standing to litigate the constitutionality of DOMA. In addition, the Executive branch would have unilaterally
effected a change in the law through an unconstitutional suspension of the law. See Lindevaldsen, supra note 50, at 26-31.

57

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687.

58

Id. at 2688.

59

Id.

60

As a result, the Court did not reach the question of whether the BLAG had standing to appeal the district court's decision. Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 2688 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).

63

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

66

Id.

67

Id. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the more than two centuries that this Court has existed as an institution, we have never
suggested that we have the power to decide a question when every party agrees with both its nominal opponent and the court
below on that question's answer.”).

68

Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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69

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (majority opinion).

70

Id. at 2692.

71

Id. at 2693.

72

Id. at 2694-95.

73

Id. at 2693.

74

Id.

75

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.

76

Id. at 2692 (emphasis added).

77

Id. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 2697-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

78

See id. at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting).

79

Id. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

80

Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

81

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting)

82

Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

83

Id. at 2709.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting).

86

Id. at 2715.

87

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting).

88

Id. at 2718.

89

Id.

90

Id. at 2720.

91

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).

92

Id. at 2593.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 2604-05, 2607-08.

97

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
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98

Id. at 2593-94.

99

Id. at 2594.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 2594.

102

As Justice Alito explained in his dissent in Windsor,
We can expect something similar to take place if same-sex marriage becomes widely accepted. The long-term consequences of
this change are not now known and are unlikely to be ascertainable for some time to come. There are those who think that
allowing same-sex marriage will seriously undermine the institution of marriage. Others think that recognition of same-sex
marriage will fortify a now-shaky institution. At present, no one--including social scientists, philosophers, and historians-can predict with any certainty what the longterm ramifications of widespread acceptance of same-sex marriage will be. And
judges are certainly not equipped to make such an assessment.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715-16 (2013); see also Jason Richwine & Jennifer A. Marshall, The
Regnerus Study: Social Science on New Family Structures Met with Intolerance, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct.
2, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/the-regnerus-study-social-science-on-new-family-structures-metwith-intolerance (discussing methodological flaws in studies claiming that “‘no differences' exist between children whose
parents had a same-sex relationship and children who were raised by their married biological parents, previous research cannot
support such an assertion”).

103

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596.

104

Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Obergefell dissent:
An established method of substantive due process analysis has two primary features. First, we have regularly observed that
the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition” ... and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed.”
Id. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Court also requires a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). In Obergefell, Justice Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
reaffirmed the Glucksberg analysis as the proper analysis for asserted fundamental rights under the due process clause. See
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) (“To prevent five unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty upon
the American people, the Court has held that ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect only
those rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.”’).

105

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.

106

Id. at 2599.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 2599-2600.

110

Id. at 2600.

111

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. But see Peter Sprigg, New Study on Homosexual Parents Tops All Previous Research, FAMILY
RESEARCH COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/issuebrief/new-study-on-homosexual-parents-tops-all-previous-research (last
visited Apr. 21, 2017) (discussing various studies).

112

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
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113

Id. at 2600-01.

114

Id. at 2601.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590, 2602.

119

Id. at 2594 (“[T]he institution [of marriage] has existed for millennia .... It is fair and necessary to say these references were
based on the understanding that marriage is the union between two persons of the opposite sex.”).

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 2594.

123

Id. at 2602.

124

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603-04.

125

Id. at 2608.

126

Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas); id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Justice
Thomas); id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas).

127

Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

128

Id.

129

Id. at 2616.

130

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618-19. Chief Justice Roberts explained in Obergefell that in the sixty years after Lochner, the Court
struck down nearly 200 laws as violations of individual liberty. Id. at 2617. In 1963, “the Court recognized its error and vowed
not to repeat it.” Id. “‘The doctrine that ... due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the
legislature has acted unwisely ... has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition
that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies who are elected to pass
laws.”’ Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)).

131

Id. at 2620.

132

Id. at 2621 (citations omitted).

133

Id. at 2622-23. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (“Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution.”).

134

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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135

Id. at 2624; see also THE FEDERALIST, NO. 78, at 464-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (explaining
that “the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains
truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers”’).

136

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

137

Id. at 2627.

138

Id. at 2629.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 2630.

142

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

143

Id. at 2639.

144

Id.

145

See id. at 2594 (“[L]ifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons ....”); id.
at 2596 (“[I]n the period after World War II, the argument that gays and lesbians had a just claim to dignity was in conflict
with both law and widespread social conventions.”); id. at 2597 (“[T]hese liberties extend to certain personal choices central to
individual dignity and autonomy ....”); id. at 2603 (the historical sex-based classification in marriage have “denied the equal
dignity of men and women”); id. at 2606 (framing the issue as to whether the state of Tennessee “can deny to one who has
served this Nation the basic dignity of recognizing his New York marriage”); id. at 2608 (“They ask for equal dignity in the
eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).

146

Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).

147

Id. at 2642.

148

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2643.

149

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1248 (10th ed. 2001).

150

Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, supra note 1, at 1247 (“We can say all sorts of things, but we cannot say why one is better than any
other unless we state some standard by which it definedly is.”).

151

See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 439 (2006) (academic freedom); Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting
Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999) (free speech); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 115 n.12 (1990) (free expression); Univ. of
Pa. v. E.E.O.C, 493 U.S. 182, 195-96 (1990) (academic freedom); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 241-42 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (free speech); Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
(First Amendment imperatives).

152

Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 580-81 (1990) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379).

153

Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 433 n.13 (1979).

154

Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461, 462 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

155

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996).
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156

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990).

157

See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 228 (2002); Ford Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C, 458 U.S.
219, 227 (1982).

158

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

159

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985) (White, J., concurring).

160

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

161

Edward v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY).

162

THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 275-76 (James Madison).

163

Titus, supra note 23, at 338, 340-41 (“[T]rue liberty in the civil realm must conform to the will, the word, and the plan of God.”).

164

Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, supra note 1, at 1238.

165

Id. at 1245-48.

166

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1248 (10th ed. 2010).

167

AM. HUMANIST ASS'N, HUMANIST MANIFESTO II, http://americanhumanist.org/humanism/humanist_manifesto_ii;
see also AM. HUMANIST ASS'N, HUMANIST MANIFESTO I (“Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted
by modern science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values. Obviously humanism does
not deny the possibility of realities as yet undiscovered, but it does insist that the way to determine the existence and value of
any and all realities is by means of intelligent inquiry and by the assessment of their relations to human needs.”).

168

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

169

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).

170

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (repeating the evolving
standards of decency as the prevailing standard).

171

Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2642 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)).

172

Id. at 2649 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972)).

173

Id. at 2650. The fact that the Court admittedly interprets the Eighth Amendment according to its own value judgments about
the validity of the punishment raises separation of powers concerns. When any court substitutes its own policy judgment for
that of the legislature, it improperly usurps legislative powers. The Utah Supreme Court has explained,
As a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts. This is especially true when the determination
or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another. The responsibility for drawing
lines in a society as complex as ours--of identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between
competing alternatives--is the Legislature's, not the judiciary's.
Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 817 (Utah 2007) (quoting Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Mich. 1999)).

174

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597 (2003) (referring to an “emerging awareness” about same-sex relations).

175

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1983).

176

Id. at 196.
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177

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.

178

Id. at 559.

179

Id. at 572 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2, cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1980)). Cf. JUDITH REISMAN, STOLEN
HONOR STOLEN INNOCENCE (4th ed. 2013) (explaining how Kinsey's research, which involved sexual exploitation of
hundreds of infants and children, lays at the foundation of the changes to the Model Penal Code).

180

Id. at 572.

181

See id. at 567-68 (relying on a decision from the European Court of Human Rights and a change in several states post-Bowers
to repeal bans on same-sex sexual conduct).

182

Id. at 572.

183

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-75.

184

See infra n.229-43 & accompanying text (discussing the importance of the separation of powers to the rule of law); see also
Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, supra note 1, at 1233 (“[A]ll normative statements are evaluations of actions ... an evaluation entails
an evaluator ... and in the presumed absence of God, the only evaluators are people ....” So the question is “who ultimately
gets to play the role of ultimate unquestionable evaluator ...?”).

185

See generally Leff, Book Review, supra note 1.

186

Id. at 882.

187

Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, supra note 1, at 1246.

188

Leff, Book Review, supra note 1, at 887-88.

189

Id. at 888-89.

190

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).

191

Id. at para. 32.

192

Id. at para. 2. Later in the paragraph, the signers explained that it is the duty of the people to throw off a government that
has pursued a long train of abuses and usurpations against its people, evincing a design to reduce them under “absolute
Despotism ....” Id.

193

DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 141-42 (1988).

194

JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS 56
(1987).

195

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44-46.

196

Id. at *39.

197

EIDSMOE, supra note 194, at 57-58 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *40); see also ROBERTO
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 79 (1976) (describing natural law as “a normative order that transcends society
altogether”); Herbert W. Titus, The Bible and American Law, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 305, 324-25 (2008).

198

EIDSMOE, supra note 194, at 58.

199

Id.
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200

Id. at 54 (quoting Montesquieu).

201

Id.

202

Id. at 55 (quoting Montesquieu).

203

Id. at 61.

204

EIDSMOE, supra note 194, at 62 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, BOOK Two XI:136n).

205

LUTZ, supra note 193, at 142.

206

EIDSMOE, supra note 194, at 63.

207

Id. at 58; see also Romans 2:15 (“[S]ince they show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their
consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now accusing, now even defending them.”); Patrick N. Leduc, Christianity
and the Framers: The True Intent of the Establishment Clause, 5 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 201, 218-19 (2011); see generally
MARK A. BELILES AND DOUGLAS S. ANDERSON, CONTENDING FOR THE CONSTITUTION, RECALLING
THE CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE ON THE WRITING OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BIBLICAL BASIS OF
AMERICAN LAW AND LIBERTY (2005).

208

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

209

See Mike Maharrey, You Don't Have Constitutional Rights, TENTH AMENDMENT
tenthamendmentcenter.com/2011/12/13/you-dont-have-constitutional-rights/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).

210

For example, a proper reliance on the God-given dignity of all human beings would have prevented the Court's decisions in
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (denying the inherent worth and dignity of all humans in affirming forced sterilization
of those the state deemed “manifestly unfit from continuing their kind”) and Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 406 (1856)
(ignoring the biblical truth that all people are created in God's image, concluding that those born of African descent were not
“people” under the United States Constitution).

211

Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 406-407 (Pa. 1824).

212

AM. HUMANIST ASS'N, HUMANIST MANIFESTO II (1973), http://americanhumanist.org/humanism/
humanist_manifesto_ii (“[M]oral values derive their source from human experience.”).

213

S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).

214

Id. at 222. The dissenting justices in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), staked out a position in direct conflict with
the notion that the court is to find new rights and proclaim them to be a part of the Constitution. Justice Black explained
that the majority opinion was incorrectly premised on the belief that the Court was vested with the “power to invalidate all
state laws that it consider[s] to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive .... The power to make such decisions is of
course that of a legislative body.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511-12. Justice Stewart similarly explained that “it is not the function
of this Court to decide cases on the basis of community standards.” Id. at 530.

215

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it .... But when a long train of abuses and usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty,
to throw off such Government ....”).

216

Romans 13:1.
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217

Romans 13:4; see also Benjamin S. Walton, The Authoritativeness and Usefulness of the Principles of God's Old Covenant Law
for the New Covenant Church and State, 5 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 419, 447 (2011).

218

HERMAN BELZ, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 7 (2009).

219

Jeffrey Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 297, 306 & n. 53 (2010) (citing
sources for the proposition that the bylaws must be read in conjunction with the principles set forth in the articles of
incorporation).

220

1A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 139 (“In order to determine the purpose for which a corporation was created, courts will primarily refer
to the stated purpose in the articles of incorporation.”).

221

8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 4166 (“Bylaws are the rules and regulations or private laws enacted by the corporation to regulate,
govern and control its own actions, affairs and concerns and its shareholders or members and its directors and officers with
relation to each other and among themselves in their relation to the corporation.”).

222

See Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant
Church, 98 F.3d 78, 95 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[P]rovisions of a corporation's charter or articles of incorporation enjoy priority
over contradictory or inconsistent by-laws.”); Essential Enters. Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prod., Inc., 159 A.2d 288, 289 (Del.
Ch. 1960) (“We start from the premise that a by-law which is in conflict with a provision in a certificate of incorporation is
invalid.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (“The by-laws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with the
law or with the certificate of incorporation.”); 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4171 (“[C]orporations have the power to make and alter bylaws, not
inconsistent with its articles of incorporation.”).

223

Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897).

224

See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION (2000);
MARK A. BELILES AND DOUGLAS S. ANDERSON, CONTENDING FOR THE CONSTITUTION (2005);
DANIEL DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE (2003); JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR
FOUNDING FATHERS (1987); WILLIAM J. FEDERER, THE ORIGINAL 13: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
RELIGION IN AMERICA'S FIRST THIRTEEN STATES (2007); MARK R. LEVIN, LIBERTY AND TYRANNY: A
CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO (2009); CHATHERINE MILLARD, THE REWRITING OF AMERICA'S HISTORY
(1991).

225

BELILES & ANDERSON, supra note 207, at 27 (quoting JAMES MADISON'S NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 209-10 (1987)).

226

President George Washington,
american_originals/inaugtxt.html.

227

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).

228

James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Madison/01-08-02-0163.

229

Harry S. Truman, Proclamation 2978 National Day of Prayer (June 17, 1952), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?
pid=87332.

First

Inaugural

Address

(April

30,

1789),

http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/
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230

See, e.g., Romans 5:12 (“Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way
death came to all men, because all sinned.”); Romans 3:23 (“For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.”).

231

THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).

232

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).

233

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).

234

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).

235

Id. at 758.

236

Brutus XV (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES at 304 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003).

237

Id. at 305.

238

Brutus XI (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES at 298 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003).

239

Id. (“When the courts will have a precedent before them of a court which extended its jurisdiction in opposition to an act of
the legislature, is it not to be expected that they will extend theirs, especially when there is nothing in the constitution expressly
against it? and they are authorised to construe its meaning, and are not under any control? This power in the judicial, will
enable them to mould the government, into almost any shape they please.”).

240

Brutus XV (Oct. 18, 1787), supra note 236, at 308 (emphasis added).

241

THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 2003).

242

Id.

243

Id. at 483-84.

244

Id. at 484.

245

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). Hamilton later wrote, “It proves
incontestably that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of three departments of power.” Id.

246

Id. at 467.

247

Id. at 465.

248

Id. at 464-65.

249

BELILES & ANDERSON, supra note 207, at 138.

250

Planned Parenthood of S. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Keith E. Whittington,
How to Read the Constitution: Self-Government and the Jurisprudence of Originalism, HERITAGE FOUNDATION:
FIRST PRINCIPLES SERIES NO. 5, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/how-to-read-the-constitutionself-government-and-the-jurisprudence-of-originalism (“Temporary delusions, prejudices, excitements, and objects have
irresistible influence in mere questions of policy. And the policy of one age may ill suit the wishes or the policy of another.
The constitution is not subject to such fluctuations. It is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction. It should be, so far
at least as human infirmity will allow, not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday,
to-day, and for ever.”).
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251

See, e.g., Douglas McElvy, No Greater Gift, 66 ALA. L. 252, 252 (2005) (“If you paint a portrait of America's national
character, the Rule of Law would be a dominant image.”).

252

ABA Division for Public Education, Part I: What is the Rule of Law, at 4, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/publiced/features/PartlDialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf (ABA Paper).

253

JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 296 (2000).

254

Id. at 253, 350 (“Under God, said the exponents of the rule of law, the law governs us; it is not by mere men that we ought to
be governed; we can appeal from the whims and vagaries of human rulers to the unchanging law.”).

255

McElvy, supra note 251, at 252; see also BELZ, supra note 218, at vii.

256

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009).

257

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990); see also MCCLELLAN, supra note 253, at 350 (“The test is not what
the rule is called, but whether the rule is general, known, and certain.”).

258

Sidney B. Brooks, Building Blocks for a Rule of Law, 36 COLO. L. 19, 19-20 (2007).

259

ABA Paper, supra note 252, at 4; see also Stacy Pepper, The Defenseless Marriage Act: The Legitimacy of President Obama's
Refusal to Defend DOMA § 3, 24 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 12 (2013) (recognizing that “a President free to disregard the
will of the Court and Congress is dangerously tantamount to a king”).

260

ABA Paper, supra note 252, at 4; see also Stephen S. Trott, The Two-Sided Guarantee of Religious Freedom Commencement
Address: Albertson College May 31, 2003, 46 OCT ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 34, 35 (2003) (“[T]he Founders made it crystal
clear in drafting our Constitution that our government would be with the consent of the governed, and that we would be
guided not by the whim of self-anointed leaders, but by the rule of law.”).

261

ABA Paper, supra note 252, at 5. Elizabeth Cady Stanton is quoted as stating that “[i]t is very important in a republic, that
people should respect the laws, for if we throw them to the winds, what becomes of civil government?” Id.

262

Id. “If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.”
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.); see also Curt A. Levey & Kenneth A.
Klukowski, Take Care Now: Stare Decisis and the President's Duty to Defend Acts of Congress, 37 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL'Y
377, 380 (2014) (leaving the enforcement or defense of laws to the subjective whim of each administration is a “recipe for
chaos”).

263

ABA Paper, supra note 252, at 5. The ABA paper quoted U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Diane Wood. See Diane P. Wood,
The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 457 (2003).

264

ABA Paper, supra note 252, at 5.

265

Id.

266

Id. at 6.

267

D. Brooks Smith, Promoting the Rule of Law and Respecting the Separation of Powers: The Legitimate Role of the American
Judiciary Abroad, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
284 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)).

268

MCCLELLAN, supra note 253, at 353 (“[T]he Constitution rested on the proposition that all constitutional government is
by definition limited government.”).
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269

See LUTZ, supra note 193, at 15; see also McClellan, supra note 253, at 353.

270

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 318-19 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).

271

THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).

272

MCCLELLAN, supra note 253, at 353.

273

Id. In Federalist No. 51, Madison explained the basis of the fear that people in power, if left unrestrained and unchecked,
would abuse their authority. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). “If men were
angels no government would be necessary.” Id. Men (and women) are not angels and, thus, we must “enable the government
to control the governed, an in the next place oblige itself to control itself.” Id.

274

Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6
(1993). Another important component of limited government is that there are limits on governments even when they are
acting within their delegated sphere because all law is subject to a higher law. LUTZ, supra note 193, at 15. For example, the
Declaration of Independence recognizes that certain rights are inalienable and thus cannot be taken away by government. Id.
Martin Luther King, Jr., in his Letter from the Birmingham Jail echoed this same truth when he stated that “there are two types
of laws: There are just and there are unjust laws.” Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail 7 (1963), http://
okra.stanford.edu/transcription/document_images/undecided/630416-019.pdf. He explained that a “just law is a man-made
code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To
put it in the terms of Saint Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law.” Id.

275

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.”).

276

Genesis 1:27.

277

Psalm 139:13.

278

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

279

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) (“The Act does apply both previability and postviability because, by common
understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside
the womb.”).

280

Planned Parenthood of S. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“After analyzing the usage of
‘person’ in the Constitution, the Court concluded that that word ‘has application only postnatally.”’); id. at 913 (“Thus, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, a developing organism that is not yet a ‘person’ does not have what is sometimes described
as a ‘right to life.”’).

281

Id. at 846.

282

Id. (“These principles do not contradict one another ....”).

283

Ecclesiastes 11:5 (English Standard) (“As you do not know the way the spirit comes to the bones in the womb of a woman
with child, so you do not know the work of God who makes everything.”); see also Genesis 9:6 (English Standard) (“Whoever
sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image.”).

284

See, e.g., Job 31:15; Psalm 139:13; Isaiah 44:2, 24; Isaiah 49:5; Jeremiah 1:4.

285

Casey, 505 U.S. at 858-59, 869.

286

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
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287

Id. at 159 (“We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.”).

288

Fetal Homicide Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Mar. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx. Cf. Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 738 (Ala. 2012) (Parker, J., concurring)
(noting that as of 2010, “[a]t least 38 states have enacted fetal-homicide statutes, and 28 of those states protect life from
conception”); State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 733 (2010) (affirming conviction under fetal-homicide statute); State v.
Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding constitutionality of fetal-homicide statute).

289

Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 738.

290

Fetal Homicide Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Mar. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx.

291

Ex parte Ankron, 152 So. 3d 397, 401 (Ala. 2013); In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d 366, 370 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998). But see
State v. Stegall, 838 N.W.2d 526 (N.D. 2013) (holding that an unborn child is not protected by child endangerment statutes);
State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663 (Md. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to treat unborn child as person for child endangerment statutes).

292

In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 370.

293

Job 10:18-19; Jeremiah 20:17.

294

Hosea 12:3.

295

Luke 1:41-45.

296

Exodus 20:13; Psalm 106:37-38 (New American Standard) (“They mingled with the nations and learned their practices .... They
sacrificed their sons and their daughters to [] demons, and shed innocent blood, the blood of their sons and their daughters,
whom they sacrificed to the idols of Canaan; And the land was polluted with blood.”).

297

Planned Parenthood of S. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).

298

See Justice Thomas' dissent in Obergefell for a discussion of an originalist interpretation of the liberty guarantee. He explains
that it was to protect against improper physical restraints, not to protect the right of people to define the mystery of human
life. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2554, 2631-37 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Roberts' dissent discusses
how the Obergefell majority usurped legislative powers. Id. at 2611-12 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

299

Liberty, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828).

300

Id. (emphasis added).

301

See supra notes 170-73 & accompanying text.

302

Titus, supra note 23, at 328-29.

303

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607-08; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).

304

John 8:1-11. The Pharisees had caught a woman in adultery and wanted to stone her to death. Id. Jesus forgave the woman
and admonished her to sin no more--implying through the grant of forgiveness and admonition that adultery constituted
sinful conduct. Id.

305

See, e.g., Deuteronomy 22:13-28 (New American Standard) (stating that sexual relations before marriage was referred to as
“an act of folly” and constituted a capital offense); 1 Corinthians 6:9 (New International) (“Neither the sexually immoral nor
idolaters nor adulterers ... will inherit the kingdom of God.”); 2 Corinthians 12:21 (New International) (“I will be grieved
over many who have sinned earlier and have not repented of the impurity, sexual sin and debauchery in which they have
indulged.”); Galatians 5:9 (New International) (“The acts of the sinful nature are obvious: sexual immorality, impurity ....”);
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Hebrews 13:4 (New International) (“Marriage should be honored by all, and the marriage bed kept pure, for God will judge
the adulterer and all the sexually immoral.”).

306

Romans 1:26.

307

Romans 1:25-27.

308

See Genesis 2:24 (New International) (“[A] man leaves his father and mother and is united to his wife, and they become one
flesh.”). Jesus reaffirmed this in Matthew 19:3-5, expressly referring back to the Genesis account when answering the Pharisees'
question about divorce.

309

John Piper, A Metaphor of Christ and the Church, DESIRING GOD (February 12, 1984), http://www.desiringgod.org/articles/
a-metaphor-of-christ-and-the-church.

310

Gary Galles, Lord Acton on Liberty and Government, MISES INSTITUTE (NOV.. 5, 2002), https://mises.org/library/lordacton-liberty-and-government; Alan Keyes, Freedom Means Having the Choice, Liberty Means Using it to Do Right, THE
DAILY CALLER (Feb. 26, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/02/26/freedom-means-having-the-choice-liberty-means-usingit-to-do-right/2/.

311

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2554, 2601 (2015).

312

Id. at 2602.

313

Id. at 2594, 2599.

314

Id. at 2602.

315

Id. at 2604.

316

Id. at 2597.

317

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to the Declaration of Independence for his assertion that
“human dignity is innate”).

318

Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

319

See Dana Bell, A Republic if You Can Keep It, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://blogs.loc.gov/
teachers/2016/09/a-republic-if-you-can-keep-it/.
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